STANDARDS UPDATE NOTICE (SUN)
ISSUED: August 20, 2018

STANDARD INFORMATION

Standard Number: UL 1973
Standard Name: Batteries for Use in Stationary, Vehicle Auxiliary Power and Light Electric Rail (LER)
Standard Edition and Issue Date: 2nd Edition Dated February 7, 2018
Date of Revision: February 7, 2018
Date of Previous Revision of Standard: June 1, 2016

EFFECTIVE DATE OF NEW/REVISED REQUIREMENTS

Effective Date: **April 1, 2020**

IMPACT, OVERVIEW, AND ACTION REQUIRED

Impact Statement: A review of all Listing Reports is necessary to determine which products comply with new/revised requirements and which products will require re-evaluation. **NOTE:** Effective immediately, this revised standard will be exclusively used for evaluation of new products unless the Applicant requests in writing that current requirements be used along with their understanding that their listings will be withdrawn on Effective Date noted above, unless the product is found to comply with new/revised requirements.

Overview of Changes:

- Revision of short circuit test loading
- Revision of instruction requirements to include arc flash/blast calculation information
- Revision to Internal Fire Test
- Addition of a short circuit current and duration marking for battery systems

Specific details of new/revised requirements are found in table below.

If the applicable requirements noted in the table are not described in your report(s), these requirements will need to be confirmed as met and added to your report(s) such as markings, instructions, test results, etc. (as required).

Client Action Required:

Information – To assist our Engineer with review of your Listing Reports, please submit technical information in response to the new/revised paragraphs noted in the attached or explain why these new/revised requirements do not apply to your product (s).

Current Listings Not Active? – Please immediately identify any current Listing Reports or products that are no longer active and should be removed from our records. We will do this at no charge as long as Intertek is notified in writing prior to the review of your reports.

STANDARD INFORMATION

CLAUSE	VERDICT	COMMENT
		Additions to existing requirements are underlined and deletions are shown lined out below.
16	Info	**Short Circuit Test**
16.2		The sample shall be short-circuited by connecting the positive and negative terminals of the sample with a shorting device having resistance as low as practicable. In all cases the resistive circuit load shall have ~~resistive circuit load having~~ a maximum total resistance of 20 mΩ, as measured from the DUT terminals. For battery systems, the short circuit discharge profile at the terminals for current and time shall be recorded and compared with the manufacturer's specified value in 41.3.
16.11		***New clause added;*** For battery systems, the measured maximum short circuit current and duration at that maximum value shall not be greater than the specified value of 41.3.
37		**Internal Fire Exposure Test** *Section deleted*
39		***New section added;*** **Single Cell Failure Design Tolerance**
39.1		**General**
39.1.1		There have been field incidents with various battery technologies that have been attributed to a cell failure, which led to a hazardous event. The cell failures in these incidents were the result of either manufacturing defects or insufficient cell or battery design or a combination of both. Since there is a possibility that a cell may fail within a battery system, the battery system shall be designed to prevent a single cell failure from propagating to the extent that there is fire external to the DUT or an explosion.
39.1.2		The cell failure mechanism used for this testing shall reflect what is known or anticipated to occur in the field for a given technology. If the cell failure mechanism cannot be exactly replicated, a close simulation of what is known to occur in the field through the use of an external stress such as applied heating or mechanical force shall be utilized for the test. Examples of methods to simulate a single cell failure are outlined in Appendix F. Multiple tests and possible multiple failure methods may need to be conducted as part of the analysis before a final methodology for testing is determined.
39.2		**Single cell failure design tolerance (lithium ion)**

39.2.1	A lithium ion battery system shall be designed to mitigate a single cell failure leading to a thermal runaway of that cell. With lithium ion batteries, it is often the effects of propagation to surrounding cells due to the heating effect of the initial cell failure that leads to hazardous events. The DUT (e.g. battery pack or module) shall be designed to prevent a single cell thermal runaway failure from creating a significant hazard as evidenced by fire propagation outside of the DUT and/or an explosion.
39.2.2	Any number of methods can be used to produce a single cell thermal runaway failure. For example, thermal runaway in cells can be achieved through the use of heaters, nail penetration, overcharge, etc. The testing agency is responsible for selecting and demonstrating an appropriate method for inducing thermal runaway. It is recommended to evaluate a candidate method first using a small subassembly of cells to evaluate the cell failure and effects to surrounding cells. During an effort to establish a suitable failure method, temperatures should be taken on the cell casings, and voltages measured for information purposes. See Appendix F for guidance on several methods of inducing cell failure. The method chosen shall be agreed upon by the testing agency.
39.2.3	The details of the method used when analyzing the cell's reaction that can impact the results are to be documented. For example, if heating the cell to achieve failure: e.g. the type of heater and its dimensions, location on the cell where the heater is placed and how it is placed, maximum temperature attained including temperature ramp rate, length of time until reaction, temperatures on cell and voltage, state of charge of the cell at the beginning of the heating phase, etc. The test article shall be representative of the actual battery configuration and any modifications should not significantly impact the test results. For example, if overcharge is to be carried out, the heat conduction path between tabs shall not be hindered as that may reduce the severity of the test.
39.2.4	Once a suitable method of cell failure has been determined, the fully charged DUT (MOSOC per 8.1) shall be subjected to the single cell failure tolerance test, which consists of inducing a fault in one internal cell that is within the DUT, until cell failure resulting in thermal runaway as defined in 6.47 occurs, and determining whether or not that failure produces a significant external hazard or whether or not that failure does not cause the failure of neighboring cells. If cascading occurs, the cascading shall not propagate beyond the DUT. Prior to choosing the specific cell to fail, an analysis of the DUT design to determine the cell location considered to have the greatest potential to lead to a significant external hazard shall be conducted, taking into consideration the cell's proximity to other cells and materials that may lead to potential for propagation. If it can impact the results, the sample shall be at the maximum specified temperature during charging and operation with some tolerance as necessary for movement of the sample outside of the chamber during testing, but within ±5°C (±9°F). Once the thermal runaway is initiated, the mechanism used to create thermal runaway is shut off or stopped and the DUT is subjected to a 24-h observation period. Exception No. 1: Testing may be repeated on another sample with a cell in a

	different location within the DUT if it is not clear which location represents the worst case scenario. The location of the failed cell shall be documented for each test. Exception No. 2: Testing may be conducted on a representative subassembly consisting of one or more modules and surrounding representative environment, if it can be demonstrated that there is no propagation beyond the subassembly. When testing at the module or subassembly level, consideration needs to be made of the vulnerability to combustion of those components surrounding the module in the final assembly. Temperatures on DUT external surfaces and surfaces of parts in contact with or near the DUT in the final assembly shall be monitored to determine if excessive temperature on these adjacent parts could result in a potential for propagation within the full battery system. If there are excessive temperatures on the surfaces that may lead to potential for propagation, testing shall be repeated with all adjacent components in place of a complete battery system.
39.2.5	Temperatures on the failed cell and surrounding cells are to be monitored and reported for information purposes.
39.2.6	As a result of the testing of 39.2, there shall be no fire propagating from the DUT or explosion of the DUT.
39.3	**Single cell failure design tolerance (other technologies)**
39.3.1	Other technologies such as lithium metal, sodium sulfur, sodium nickel chloride, and lead acid where there may not be enough field data regarding their tolerance to single cell failure events, are to be subjected to a single cell failure test method similar to 39.2, except as modified as noted below. The failure mechanism for these technologies may be different than that of lithium ion and thermal runaway may or may not result from the cell failure. Similar to lithium ion, when choosing a cell failure technique, it should be representative of what can occur in the field for the particular technology. The failure mechanism chosen shall consider failures due to potential cell manufacturing defects for that technology and/or cell and battery design deficiencies that could lead to latent failures of the cell, and that would not be evident under the individual cell safety testing.
39.3.2	For other technologies, similarly as with lithium ion, it is recommended to evaluate a candidate method first using a small subassembly of cells to evaluate the cell failure and effects to surrounding cells. During an effort to establish a suitable failure method, temperatures should be taken on the cell casings, and voltages measured for information purposes. See Appendix F for guidance on several methods of inducing cell failure. The method chosen shall be agreed upon by the testing agency.
39.3.3	When a suitable worse case representative method for cell failure has been determined, the DUT is to be subjected to the internal cell failure occurring in the location within the DUT considered most vulnerable to the potential for propagation. The DUT shall be in a condition that reflects its operating parameters at the worst moment such a failure could occur. For example, the DUT shall be at its nominal operating temperature. During the test, temperatures shall be monitored in critical locations such as adjoining cells during the test to record the

		rise in temperature due to the internal failure. If no thermal runaway occurs as a result of the single cell failure, the test is stopped when the DUT temperature has stabilized or reaches ambient room temperature, and the DUT is subjected to a 24-h observation period. If a thermal runaway is initiated, the mechanism used to create thermal runaway is shut off or stopped and the DUT is subjected to a 24-h observation period. Exception No. 1: Testing may be repeated on another sample with a cell in a different location within the DUT if it is not clear which location tested represented the worst case scenario. The location of the failed cell is to be documented for each test. Exception No. 2: Testing may be conducted on a representative subassembly consisting of one or more modules and surrounding representative environment, if it can be demonstrated that there is no propagation beyond the subassembly. When testing at the module or subassembly level, consideration needs to be made of the vulnerability to combustion of those components surrounding the modules in the final assembly.
39.3.4		As a result of the testing per 39.3.3, there shall be no fire propagating from the DUT or explosion of the DUT.
	Info	**MANUFACTURING AND PRODUCTION LINE TESTS**
40	Info	**General**
40.1		***New clause added;*** Manufacturers of battery systems shall have documented production process controls in place that continually monitor the following key elements of the manufacturing process that can affect safety, and shall include corrective/preventative action to address defects found affecting these key elements: a) Supply chain control; and b) Assembly processes.
	Info	**MARKINGS**
41	Info	**General**
41.3		***New clause added;*** Battery systems shall be marked with the maximum short circuit current and duration (at maximum short circuit current) at the system output terminals.
	Info	**INSTRUCTIONS**
42	Info	**General**

	New subclauses added;
42.2	Systems shall be provided with complete instructions for installation in the end use application. Installation instructions shall include the following along with any other instructions necessary for the safe and correct installation of the system and its accessories in the intended end use: i) The necessary information to complete an arc flash/blast analysis, including bolted fault current (IBF), 1/2 bolted fault current (1/2 IBF), protective device clearing time, and protective device current interrupt capability at a minimum, if applicable to the system; and j) If applicable, the manufacturer shall provide information on design considerations for maximum and minimum system configurations, such as number of modules installed in series, maximum resistance, and maximum inductance to prevent arc flash incident energy from exceeding the requirements of Personal Protective Equipment Category 4 per NFPA 70E or CSA Z462-15.

	CUSTOMERS PLEASE NOTE: This Table and column "Verdict" can be used in determining how your current or future production is or will be in compliance with new/revised requirements.